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1 Introduction
Several studies describe corruption as an obstacle to local welfare-eﬀects from
business and industry (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 2005; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). This problem has triggered debates about the responsibil-
ity of multinationals to refrain from corruption-related temptations in their
interaction with local markets and governments (Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Seu-
bert, 2005; Bray, 2005). Several measures have also been taken to strengthen
international anti-bribery regulations (OECD, 2005).
The presence of business-corruption implies that firms lose contracts be-
cause competitors oﬀer bribes. An interesting aspect of this corruption thus
relates to the responses of the victimized firms: What is the common re-
action if a contract is lost because a competitor has oﬀered a bribe? Firms
that lose contracts because competitors oﬀer bribes are often the best placed
to perceive instances of corruption. The potential impact on the business
climate if firms were to react against each others’ bribery is significant. This
suggests that multinationals may have a broader responsibility in respect
of combatting corruption than simply adopting a passive “we-do not-pay-
bribes-ourselves” stance.
In practice, reactions against competitors who oﬀer bribes rarely take
place. Firms prefer to stay silent about this form of corporate oﬀense even
when they have lost important business opportunities and wasted significant
amounts in tender expenses as a result. They rarely lodge complaints against
the tender procedures, they do not seek legal redress by initiating a court
action, and they seldom ask their home country to intervene at a diplomatic
level. Furthermore, they do not make liability claims for lost tender expenses,
and they do not make their suspicions public in other ways.
These preferences were revealed in a recent business survey (Søreide,
2006). The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Confederation of
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), the largest business organization in Norway,
and the respondents were Norwegian exporters. Two thirds of the responding
firms believed that they had lost important contracts because competitors
had oﬀered bribes. Even so, a clear majority of these firms would never
make a whistle-blower reaction against competitors who engaged in corrupt
practices.
A lack of proof was the reason cited for inaction by 12 percent of the
respondents. The explanation most frequently cited, though, was a concern
about ”future business cooperation”, which was referred to by 31 percent of
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the firms. Curiously, firms that had never cooperated formally with other
firms in the industry were just as concerned about the adverse impact of any
whistle-blowing on future business cooperation as those which had this kind
of cooperation. The concern about business cooperation was significantly
stronger among highly profitable firms, whereas firms that operated under a
stronger degree of price pressure where more concerned about how customers
would consider a whistle-blower reaction about corruption.
These findings on business cooperation and market power do not neces-
sarily point at issues related to collusion between firms. They do, however,
reveal a strong link between profitability, relations with other firms in the
market, and a low propensity to react proactively against corruption.
However, the quality of local institutions also appeared important. Firms
were significantly more prepared to react proactively to perceived instances
of corruption in a country where the level of corruption is perceived to be
low than in a country where corruption is perceived to be widespread.
This connection between the propensity to speak out and the perceived
level of corruption was not further explored in the survey. One possible
interpretation is that firms will not react against bribery unless they expect
local judicial institutions to respond to a complaint with proper investigation
of the facts. The level of corruption referred to by the survey-respondents
at this issue could also relate to other arenas. For instance, firms may not
wish to react against cases of bribery if local politicians benefit from this
corruption.
The present article builds on data generated by the business survey and
aims at explaining some of the survey results with the help of economic
theory. It is thus an attempt to shed light on the way in which industry
structure and institutional quality may aﬀect a company’s incentive to react
against corruption.
Connections between industry structure and corruption-related decision-
making have not been much explored. Svensson (2000) describes the level of
bribes as a function of profits and sunk cost. Ades and Di Tella (1999) found
corruption to be more widespread in countries where companies obtain high
rents, where antitrust regulation function poorly, and where domestic firms
are sheltered from foreign competition. Evidence for a similar connection is
provided by the World Bank’s investment climate studies, in which a number
of business climate qualities have been estimated. According to these data,
published by Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003), there is a strong correlation
between the function of antitrust institutions in a given country and the firms’
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reported problems related to corruption, as is illustrated in Table 1.1
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Table 1. Percentages of business people in various countries who consider the
level of corruption and local antitrust policies, respectively, as obstacles to
business. The quality of the judiciary and the level of organized crime are
included with weak colours.
The results of the study reported in Table 1, in combination with the
survey results (Søreide, 2006), suggest that: (i) industrial structure is an im-
portant factor in understanding corruption-related decisions; (ii) the oppor-
tunity for firms to collude is higher in markets where corruption is common.
These suggestions are not controversial. The pertinent question is whether
industrial structure and the opportunity for collusion can explain the absence
of whistle-blowing reactions against perceived cases of corruption. I will ex-
plore this issue by drawing on standard theories of industrial organization.
From this perspective, I will consider the importance of heterogeneity among
firms, the quality of local institutions and the presence of political corruption.
Although the empirical evidence shows a link between corruption and col-
lusion, there are few theoretical models on this topic. Corruption is, for in-
stance, not an issue in Levenstein and Suslow’s (2004) extensive review of the
literature on cartel stability and success. An important contribution is made
by Lambert and Sonin (2003), however, who apply game theory to explain
1Own estimates based on data in Batra et al (2003). The correlation is significant at
the 1% level, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.48.
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why corruption stabilizes collusion in public procurement tenders. They find
corruption and collusion to be ”strategic complements”, a statement that
may apply for other situations than public procurement. Corruption can,
intuitively, function as a barrier to entry in so far as clients can be bribed by
the cartel. Corruption may also have a stabilizing function because it can be
diﬃcult for colluders to withdraw from the cartel if they have been involved
in corruption.
A firm’s potential profit if a cartel can be established, as compared to
competitive market structures, is an important part of the present study.
One relevant background paper is therefore Schmalensee’s (1987) study of
the trade-oﬀ between collusion and Cournot-competition in the case of het-
erogenous firms. Friedman and Thisse (1994) analyze the stability of a given
cartel in a symmetric oligopolistic market with homogenous firms and where
it is diﬃcult to prevent entry. They describe how entrants who are disliked
by a local cartel may end up as cartel members with profits that gradually
become equal to the incumbent firms. Like this present paper, they too
point to connections between profits and incentives to blow the whistle on
corporate crime. The present paper diﬀers from the Friedman-Thisse study
by concentrating on corruption, heterogeneity between firms, a political en-
vironment and judicial institutions. A good overview of the economics of
collusion is provided by Ivaldi et al. (2003).
This paper builds on this body of work and continues by describing a
simple theory about the importance of and connection between elements
that may prevent a firm from reacting to a case of corruption. Under which
circumstances will a company react actively against the bribery conducted
by competitors?
It begins by considering the issue of market structures and the potential
benefits from collusion. A firm with ambitions about some form of cooper-
ation with competitors will usually be cautious in its interactions with its
competitors, and I assume that firms in this position will not take action
against their competitors’ corporate crime. The point of this exercise is to
sort out firms that may consider themselves inhibited by market incentives
from speaking out about corruption.
Secondly, the paper examines the role of local judicial institutions. The
perceived ability of these institutions to respond eﬀectively to an allegation
of corruption is demonstrated to exert considerable influence over a firm’s
decision to take anticorruption action or not.
The third aspect considered is political corruption. Politicians in key
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positions may respond to information about a case of business corruption,
by encouraging or preventing the investigation of the facts. The final question
thus regards the extent to which political corruption will prevent a firm from
reacting against a case of bribery.
The conclusion draws together the propositions described in the paper
into a general model of why firms rarely take action against corruption.
2 Why not react?
A firm is convinced that it has just lost an important business project be-
cause a competitor has oﬀered a bribe. Whether it decides to reveal its
grievance or stay silent about it depends on its assessment of the expected
costs and benefits. Although there are several options in this situation, this
analysis concentrates on the choice between (1) blowing the whistle about
the corruption and (2) remaining silent about it. For simplicity I will assume
that the firm is able to prove that an incident of corruption has taken place.
However, the eﬀects in many cases would be similar if the firm was only able
to reveal suspicions of corruption.
There are four main reasons why a firm may decide to react proactively
against the oﬀense. First, it may be motivated by a desire for revenge; the
bribery has cost it an important contract. Secondly, it may be the prospect
of undertaking a liability claims. International law has made it possible for
companies to sue for compensation in respect of lost tender expenses in cases
of bribery, which can amount to huge numbers. Thirdly, by reacting against
the bribery, the firm may want to signal its anti-corruption practices to the
market; this can improve its market image both overseas and back home.
Fourthly, the firm is driven by principles; its ability to prove the oﬀence
presents it with a specific opportunity to improve the local business climate.
In this paper I will not consider the morality, the connection to the given
country, or, in other ways, the background of the potential whistle-blower.
The focus is rather on describing the costs and benefits of whistle-blowing
on corruption for a firm that is operating in a market as one of several
competitors, while also being subject to political conditions.
As a possible cost, executives are worried that speaking out about corrup-
tion will mean that in the future they will be unable to establish a profitable
cooperation with their competitors, some form of a cartel. They will not
reveal the bribery conducted by competitors if they wish to keep an oppor-
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tunity to collude with the same competitors.2 The relevance of calculating
on collusion when considering a reaction against a case of bribery follows
directly from the correlation illustrated in Table 1: antitrust institutions
function poorly when corruption is part of the business climate. This implies
that the opportunity to obtain cartel profits is higher than elsewhere.
One possible benefit of whistle-blowing for the whistle-blower is the chance
of eliminating one or more competitors, while emerging from the incident
with its own reputation for clean and honest business practice enhanced.
This incentive to react against corruption corresponds to the third category
of motive, the signal-eﬀect.
However, the business survey revealed a common worry that reacting
against corruption might lead to undesired consequences, such as jeopardizing
diﬀerent forms of future business cooperation. These can be oﬃcial forms
of cooperation, like consortial agreements, i.e. they do not have to resemble
collusion. And during interviews, which were conducted as part of the survey
project, several executives said that they preferred not to make any fuss
about competitors’ corruption although it had cost them contracts. I will
therefore assume that firms will react against corruption only if they expect
some benefit.
2.1 Market incentives
Consider an exogenously given number, N > 1, of heterogenous firms that
meet regularly in the same oligopolistic markets. They each produce the
quantity of qi ∈ [0,∞) at the variable cost of ciqi, and thus a marginal cost
of ci < 1. The firms produce a homogenous output, the demand for which is
given by the inverse linear demand function, p(Q) = 1−Q, whereQ = ΣNi=1qi.
Cournot competition implies the following profit for each firm:
max
qi
πCi (qi, qqi) = qi
"
1− qi −
Ã
N
Σqj
j 6=i
!
− ci
#
(1)
We do not need information about the distribution of costs in an oligopoly
to determine price and quantities since the equilibrium can be found by the
2This assumption is independent of the possible benefits of competitors in the market,
which in many cases would suggest an opening for collusion. The business-survey suggests
a concern in these situations, which according to basic profitmaximization is unfounded.
If there already is a cartel in the market, the theory and the results would be similar.
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sum of marginal costs across the producers (Bergstrom and Varian, 1985).
Using the average marginal cost, c = ΣNi=1c/N, we can derive from (1) that
pC = 1+Nc
N+1
and qCi = c−ci+ 1−cN+1 , which leads to the following profit function
of each firm:3
πCi =
µ
c− ci +
1− c
N + 1
¶ ∙
1 +Nc
N + 1
− ci
¸
(2)
=
[N(ci − c) + ci − 1]2
(N + 1)2
The potential cooperation between the firms would imply some form of
cartel profit that represents potential revenues that are higher than Cournot-
competition, given by a joint profit maximization:
max Πm = Qpm −
N
Σ
i=1
qici (3)
The eﬃciency of a considered cartel, in terms of production shares ac-
cording to production costs, is not given. From the theory of collusion we
know that a completely eﬃcient cartel of heterogenous producers will seldom
occur (see, for instance, Ivaldi et al., 2003) and a firm would rarely make
such an assumption. We can assume that eﬃcient firms consider collusion
only if they expect at least as large a market share as other firms in the car-
tel. Less eﬃcient firms, with higher than average marginal costs, will always
benefit from collusion. In the given context, where the firms only consider
the opportunities to get a higher profit than in Cournot-competition, we can
thus make the simplifying assumption that potential cartel members will get
the same market share. The revenues of a cartel member will still depend on
their own eﬃciency.4
Optimization over the average marginal cost, c = ΣNi ci/N, leads to the
symmetric output of qm = 1−c
2N
, the price pm = 1+c
2
and the total production
of Q = Nq = 1−c
2
. Each firm would thus expect at least the following profit
if a cartel is established:
πmi =
(1− ci)2
4N
(4)
3The result is found by solving for the aggregate production level. The first-order
condition will then lead to: qi = 1 −Qc − ci, and Q = N(1−c)N+1 , which is substituted into
the qi− expression and rewritten.
4See the appendix for the case of heterogenous quantities and increasing marginal cost.
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The firm’s decision on whether or not to react to a case of corruption
depends on its comparison of a potential cartel profit, in (4), with its present
Cournot-profit. The profit under both circumstances obviously depends on
the number of firms in the market, N , as well as the firm’s relative produc-
tivity. Solving for πCi > π
m
i , we find how large the marginal cost advantage
would have to be to make a firm consider a whistle-blower reaction, without
the risk of giving up higher profits.
c− ci >
(1− ci)(2N +N
3
2 +
√
N)
2N2
(5)
Proposition 1 The greater the cost advantage and the higher the number of
firms in the market, the less likely is the firm to be prevented from whistle-
blowing by market incentives.
Proof. The argument about cost advantage is given by (2), (4) and (5).
The derivative of (5) with respect to N is negative:
∂
∂N
(1− ci)(2N +N
3
2 +
√
N)
2N2
=
ci − 1
³
4
√
N +N + 3
´
4N
5
2
< 0.
The more eﬃcient the cartel is expected to become, the more productive
the firm would have to be to put its potential cartel profit at risk. The
greater the number of firms in the market, the lower the cartel profit will be,
and the less there is to lose if a reaction against bribery makes it diﬃcult to
collude.5
Thus far, the analysis applies common terms to describe why a firm’s
tolerance or intolerance of bribery conducted by a competitor may depend
on the possibilities to obtain cartel profits, its own eﬃciency, and the number
of firms in the market. This provides us with the features of firms that
would be unlikely to be deterred from a reaction against corruption by their
own profit-incentives. Whether these firms will actually reveal incidents of
corruption is a secondary issue, which depends on their assessments of other
consequences of such an action.
5The correlation in Table 1 suggests that this potential cartel profit may depend on
the level of corruption. If cartel eﬃciency decreases in the quality of antitrust institutions,
the firm will expect higher cartel profits the higher the levels of corruption. Its incentive
to collude, rather than blow the whistle about corruption, increases accordingly.
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2.2 Local judicial institutions
The term ”whistle-blower” usually refers to individuals who speak out about
some form of misconduct carried out by other actors in his or her own en-
vironment. The oﬀenders will always dislike the whistle-blowing, and they
might wish to react against the whistle-blower in some way. This aspect can
also be present in interactions between corporations.
Executives will seldom speak out about competitors’ involvement in cor-
ruption, unless they expect local institutions to respond to their allegations
in a constructive way, i.e. with an impartial and thorough investigation of
the allegation and subsequent prosecution of the alleged oﬀender(s). Expec-
tations about the likelihood of a successful prosecution of a firm or firms that
have been involved in corruption are therefore relevant to the decision taken
by a potential whistle-blower.
It follows directly from the given analysis that a legal sanction that is
severe enough to provide the potential whistle-blower with a cost advantage,
could influence the firm’s decision if it changes the sign of E(πCi ) − E(πmi ).
However, a legal sanction against bribery will not usually imply an increase
in the sanctioned firm’s marginal production costs. The typical sanction is
debarment from future tenders or a penalty in the form of a fine. It will not
influence the optimal Cournot-competition production quantities, qCi , but it
may lead the firm whose bribery has been detected to leave the market.
To cover the possibility that more than one competitor is involved in the
corruption, let n ≥ 0 denote the expected number of firms that will exit
the market. The expectation of n depends on the potential whistle-blower’s
assumptions about the quality of local judicial institutions. The expected
profit in a more competitive market is now described as a function of n:
πCi =
[(N − n)(ci − c) + ci − 1]2
(N − n+ 1)2
(6)
The expression in (6) is illustrated in Figure 1 with profits on the vertical
axis and the number of firms on the horizontal axis. The weaker curves
describe the case of Cournot-competition when n = 1 and n = 3, respectively.
The dashed curve is the competitive outcome when no firm leaves the market.
The potential for cartel profits is still considered, and is represented by the
solid curve. The potential whistle-blower is an “ordinary producer” in this
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picture, no more than average eﬃcient, ci = c.6
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Figure 1: Collusion versus Cournot profits. Collusion is the solid curve.
The size of a penalty, θ, required to make an average firm exit the market,
would have to be equal to this firm’s Cournot-profit.7 And, if θ = πCj we
have the following result:
Proposition 2 For a given penalty, a firm’s incentive to react against an
incident of bribery decreases in the oﬀender’s eﬃciency.
Proof.
cj < c⇒ πC − θ > 0⇒ n = 0 (7)
cj > c⇒ πC − θ < 0⇒ n > 0
and ∂πCi /∂n > 0 (in 6).
The prosecution and sanction of a producer that has been involved in cor-
ruption will, accordingly, be more beneficial to the potential whistle-blower
if the producer is relatively ineﬃcient.
6The average marginal cost is not adjusted to changes in N for the two dotted lines
in Figure 1. The point is only that the entrant does not need to have a cost-advantage
compared to the incumbent firms to benefit from the Cournot-situation.
7This size of such a penalty is not unrealistic. US penalties for corruption can amount
to ten times the profits from the given contract. Besides, the size of πCj could be close to
zero for the least eﬃcient producers.
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This is perhaps an unexpected result as most firms would prefer to elim-
inate eﬃcient competitors. What it describes is that the chances of reduc-
ing the number of competitors is higher when the oﬀender is an ineﬃcient
producer. The expected benefit in continued Cournot competition is thus
expected to be higher when the oﬀender is ineﬃcient, given that any penalty
imposed is independent of the oﬀender’s productivity. The benefit of a po-
tential cooperation with competitors, and the “cost” of speaking out about
the bribery, both decrease in the oﬀender’s ineﬃciency. In this respect, the
analysis underscores the importance of eﬃcient penalties.
A firm’s decision will depend on its expectations about the outcomes of
a possible prosecution, i.e. the eﬃciency of local judicial institutions, which
could include an economic crime unit. The higher the perceived level of
corruption in a country, the less eﬃcient are these institutions expected to
be: The more frequent the corruption, the weaker public institutions will
be, in general, and the easier it will be for an oﬀender to bribe its way out
of the mess.8 The potential whistle-blower’s incentive to react pro-actively
decreases accordingly.
This intuition corresponds to the reported survey result, that a firm’s
propensity to react to an incident of corruption is higher, the lower the per-
ceived level of corruption in the given country. Note also that this connection
suggests that firms involved in corruption have strong incentives to try to
convince their competitors that corruption is more widespread in the local
context than it really is.
Homogenous firms In the case of homogenous producers there is no mar-
ginal cost variation, and the expected response of local judicial institutions
becomes critical to whistle-blowing decisions. A firm would always protect a
potential for collusion, and never react against corruption, unless it expects
a prosecution to lead some competitors to exit. Let ci = c and n > 0 , and
(6) can be simplified as follows:
πCHi =
(1− c)2
(N − n+ 1)2 (8)
To find the expected number of firms, n, that would have to go out of
this business in order for a firm to undertake an anti-corruption reaction,
8See Andvig and Moene (1989) for a multiple equilibria model of corruption levels, and
where this argument is described.
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compare (8) and (4). Apply r = (N − n)/N to determine πCHi > πmi . If so,
we find that r = 1
N
± 2√
N
, and thus the given condition on n:9
n > 1 +N − 2
√
N (9)
A firm would consider speaking out about the bribery only for certain
combinations of N and n > 0. When the firm’s executives have little or
no confidence in local judicial institutions, and think that a whistle-blowing
reaction would be unlikely to trigger investigation by the authorities, they
will assume n = 0, and will always keep the opportunities for a cartel solution,
regardless of N. The case of homogeneity demonstrates one way in which the
eﬃciency of local judicial institutions influences those who are best placed
to uncover corruption, namely, the firms competing to tender, to speak out
about these oﬀences. The more identical the producers, the more critical is
the quality of local judicial institutions in this setting.
2.3 Political corruption
I will now consider how the presence of political corruption can also influence
a firm’s incentive to react against a case of bribery. We know that political
interests and commercial interests are often closely entangled in many of the
countries where corruption presents a significant challenge. Some politicians
strive to advance their personal interests, to the benefit of particular firms,
while oﬃcially proclaiming welfare improvement to be their one and only
aim.10 This is well described by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1994) and more
recently by Kaufmann and Vicente (2005).
Greedy politicians will obviously have a greater opportunity to obtain
bribes when the firms get some form of cartel profits rather than compete,
and they will have greater opportunities to get away with bribe-taking when
corruption is common. Political corruption therefore suggests further oppor-
tunities for the firms to collude and obtain higher profits. This adds to the
pragmatic issues that a potential whistle-blower will consider.
9Applying r to determine πC
0
i > π
m
i leads to (rN + 1)
2 < 4N ⇒ N2r2 + 2rN + (1 −
4N) < 0
⇒ r = −2N±
√
4N2−4N2(1−4N)
2N2 = −
1
N ±
√
16N3
2N2 =
1
N ± 2√N
10Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) demonstrate the implication of this trade-oﬀ between
political and personal interests in cases of privatization.
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As noted, I assume that a firm will react against a case of business cor-
ruption only if it expects some consequence. The possible consequences were
described in the previous section, i.e. some form of legal sanction against the
firms that oﬀers bribes. This sanction is now assumed to depend on the atti-
tude of politicians in key positions. I will assume that politicians have some
choice in how they react when someone speaks out about corruption. They
can try to silence the complaint by ignoring it, hinder judicial investigations
and prevent prosecution of the case by direct or indirect strategies. Or, they
can consider the whistle-blower act as an opportunity to clamp down on the
corruption. Perhaps they have been aware of the problem, though found it
diﬃcult to attack legally without a certain case.11
In the cases where local politicians would support a whistle-blower the
consequences of an expected investigation will often be unpredictable. An
eventual sanction may lead the oﬀender to leave the market, but obviously,
this is not known to the whistle-blower when it blows the whistle. The
important question for the potential whistle-blower relates to the political
response. It will indeed make a diﬀerence if there is some reason to expect
investigations, as follows by political support (n ≥ 0), rather than no response
at all, n = 0. Expectations of no responses could imply politically impeded
investigations, but also opportunities for a potential whistle-blower to rather
obtain cartel profits if keeping quiet. Whether the politicians give their
support to the prosecution of a case of corruption depends on how they
value possible personal benefits versus public obligations and welfare.
The presence of political corruption is independent of the given competi-
tion in the market. I will assume, however, that the size of the bribes they
can obtain increases with the market profit, i.e. the politicians have some
bargaining power when negotiating on the size of the bribes and can demand
higher bribes when the firms’ revenues are higher.12
11Note, a response to a whistle-blower reaction would improve the reputation of corrupt
politicians and judicial institutions. Thus, corrupt politicians can have incentives to sup-
port a specific anti-corruption reaction. Politicians in key positions are treated here as
one group. The view of politicians in opposition are not considered, although it can be
highly relevant.
12The bribes are of course paid in exchange for some benefit, for instance, the opportu-
nity to operate as a cartel, the grant of contracts or tax advantages. The specific “product”
in the corrupt transaction is not described in the model. Whether the politicians were
involved in the specific case, is not determined. To retain the focus of analysis on the
behaviour of competing firms, I will assume that the politicians’ own involvement in the
corruption will not be investigated.
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Corrupt politicians will thus prefer as few firms as possible if there is
Cournot-competition in the market. A whistle-blower reaction about cor-
ruption will then be supported only in so far as the potential oﬀender can be
forced to exit the market, and only in cases where the politicians will have
no risk of having their own corruption uncovered.
However, politicians who benefit from bribes from the firms in a market
will benefit even more if the firms collude. Cartel profits will quickly exceed
the revenues in Cournot competition when the number of firms increases.
Besides, when negotiating on the bribes, the politicians’ bargaining power
will probably increase if the firms cooperate in a way that is illegal.13
A distinction between collusion and competition is thus clearly relevant
also in this setting: The more profit in the market the more likely corrupt
politicians will be to protect the firms in the market. Hence, the more profit
in the market, the more hazardous it will be for the potential whistle-blower
to speak out about a case of corruption when political corruption is a common
problem.
Assume for now that the firms in the market are homogenous producers.
The potential for bribes depend on the total market profit, Nπi. The degree
of political corruption will depend on how much weight, γ ∈ [0, 1] , politicians
place on the potential for personal benefits, at the expense of local consumer
surplus, CS. The politicians’ utility function follows:
Up = γ
£
ΣNi=1πi
¤
+ (1− γ) [CS] (10)
The consumer surplus depends on the market structure. Following the
conventional term, (1− p)Q(p)/2:
CSC = (1− (1 +Nc
N + 1
)(
N(1− c)
N + 1
))/2 =
N2 (1− c)2
2 (N + 1)2
(11)
CSm =
(1− (1 + c)/2)
2
(
1− c
2
) =
(1− c)2
8
.
Equations (4) and (8) determine the size of ΣNi=1πi, and thus the politi-
cians’ utility, in (10), in case of collusion, Ump , and Cournot-competition, U
C
p ,
respectively:
13The stronger bargaining power if firms take part in collusion is only a comment, and
an aspect that is not part of the analysis. See the appendix for the case of ties between
politicians and only one of the firms in the market.
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Ump = γ(
N(1− c)2
4N
) + (1− γ) (1− c)
2
8
(12)
UCp = γ(
N(1− c)2
(N + 1)2
) + (1− γ)N
2 (c− 1)2
2 (N + 1)2
(13)
Note, the attitude of corrupt versus benevolent politicians in their inclina-
tion, γ, to let personal benefits influence the choices they make in public duty,
is independent of the (homogenous) firms’ production costs. Let Ump = U
C
p
and solve for γ, to get the critical value, γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] , for which the politicians
would be indiﬀerent to supporting prosecution or encouraging corruption and
collusion.
γ∗ =
3N + 1
5N − 1 (14)
The utility functions are illustrated in Figure 2, with the utility, (12) and
(13), on the vertical axis, and the number of firms, N, on the horizontal axis.
The politicians’ utility in case of collusion is independent of the number of
firms in the market.14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Um,UC
N = number of firms
a
b
UC(γL)
Um(γL)
UC(γH)
Um(γL)
Figure 2: The politicians’ expected utility
14The firms are identical and their monopoly-price is independent of their number.
16
In this figure UC(γL) and U
m(γL), the dashed curves, denote the utility
of benevolent politicians (when γ is low), in the two cases of competition and
collusion, respectively. The politicians are less interested in the potential
sizes of bribes from firms in the given market. They are more concerned
about consumer surplus. The relative utility of these benevolent politicians
obviously increases in the number of firms, when compared with a potential
situation of collusion.15 This is illustrated with the a in Figure 2. Firms
in the given market will not be ”protected” if someone speaks out about
their oﬀenses. A whistle-blower is more likely to be heard, a reaction about
corruption may trigger investigations and sanctions.
The situation with high levels of political corruption, by contrast, is de-
noted with UC(γL) and U
m(γL), the solid curve in Figure 2. The politicians
are far less concerned about the consumer surplus. These politicians’ utility
increases if the firms are able to oﬀer higher bribes. The benefit of collusion,
compared to the case of competition, is described by b in Figure 2. Also this
relative benefit increases with the the number of firms.
The result of this exercise can summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The higher the number of firms, N, (i) the more likely the
politicians are to support the whistle-blower if γ < eγ, and (ii) the more likely
they are to dislike it if γ > γ∗.
Figure 3 illustrates γ∗ as a function of N .
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6
N =number of firms
γ*
No support to the whistle-blower
Support to the whistle-blower
Indiﬀerence to the whistle-blower, γ∗, as a function of the number of firms in the
market, N.
15Of course, the benevolence of these politicians may just reflect a well-functioning
democracy, and a wish for re-election.
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When the parameter γ → 0, the politicians are concerned about the
consumer surplus only, which increases in the number of Cournot-competing
firms. When γ → 0, by contrast, the politicians will mind only about profits,
which obviously falls in the number of Cournot-competing firms.
3 Conclusion
The situation in many markets is that firms that oﬀer bribes will seldom
need to worry about reactions from those most able to uncover the practice,
namely, their competitors. Survey results presented in the introduction and
data collected by the World Bank suggest a strong connection between prof-
itability, relations with other firms in the market, and the propensity to react
against corruption.
Questioned about the absence of whistle-blowing reactions, executives in
the business survey tended to explain that firms do not react because there
is no point in doing so, or because they lack proof that corruption has taken
place. This paper has explored the motivation to keep quiet more thoroughly,
by detailing costs and benefits, and has suggested additional details in the
explanation.
The results suggested, first, that firms will not react against a case of
business corruption if that may disturb their opportunities to obtain cartel
profits. The strong empirical correlation between corruption and the oppor-
tunities to operate as a cartel supports this theory. And, second, the more
eﬃcient the oﬀender of the crime, the lower is the motivation for a potential
whistle-blower to react. The penalty is then likely to have lower or no im-
pact on the oﬀender’s role as a competitor in the market. Besides, as a third
aspect, a whistle-blower reaction on corruption can cause other obstacles if
there are connections between local politicians and firms in the given mar-
ket. The presence of such connections, however, can imply opportunities for
cartel profits, and the potential whistle-blower’s incentives to speak out may
decrease.
When these diﬀerent aspects have been examined the preconditions for a
whistle-blower reaction appear as follows: (i) A firm will not speak out about
corruption unless it is a relatively eﬃcient producer. (ii) A firm is less likely
to speak out about corruption if the oﬀender is an eﬃcient producer. (iii) A
firm will not speak out if local politicians in key positions benefit personally
from the given market.
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The theories described in this article are able to explain the conclusions
of the business survey: Firms will not engage in whistle-blowing against
corruption-related challenges in the local business climate unless local levels
of corruption are considered to be low. The theories also suggest a possi-
ble explanation to the correlation between corruption and the function of
antitrust institutions shown in Table 1: The possibilities to collude may in-
fluence firms’ incentive to react against incidents of corporate crime. The
greater or better the possibilities for collusion, the lower is the incentive to
react against corruption.
Note, however, the preconditions for reaction are not absolute, they are
suggested by these exercises as mechanisms that are likely to explain an
aspect of business practices. There are obviously important reasons why
firms should expose corruption, also when these conditions are not present.
Respondents to the business survey described the worry of having competi-
tors who oﬀer bribes as the most important underlying motivation behind
bribery (Søreide, 2006). This suggests that firms are induced to oﬀer bribes
themselves only by the thought that competitors are oﬀering bribes. The
signal-eﬀect of reacting against a case of corruption can thus have an impor-
tant influence on the business climate.
If the level of corruption is high, or the eﬀectiveness of local judicial
institutions is low, there are still benefits to be gained by reacting against the
problem. Anti-corruption eﬀorts are part of public politics in most countries
today. A high level of corruption does not imply that all public oﬃcials are
corrupt; there will usually be some investigators or politicians who are both
able and willing to respond to allegations of corruption and to prosecute the
case.
Penalties and debarment of firms will usually require proof, which in many
cases can be diﬃcult to supply. However, a lack of proof was not described by
the survey respondents as the most important reason for keeping quiet about
bribery. Indeed, there are several alternative channels for responding to this
form of corporate crime, and they do not all require proof. Firms can follow
formal procedures, and lodge an appeal to the client or tender authorities. In
this case, they will only have to draw attention to the existence of other bids
that oﬀered better price-quality combinations than the winning bid. They
can encourage local authorities to take a closer look at the deal; they do not
have to identify the firm(s) suspected of oﬀering bribes.
Other forms of redress include making representations through intelli-
gence services, embassies, journalists or anti-corruption groups, such as anti-
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corruption oﬃces established by the local government or chapters of Trans-
parency International. Alternatively, a company may submit a letter of com-
plaint to the firm that has paid a bribe. According to the business survey,
none of these channels are much applied by Norwegian firms, although the
problem of corruption appeared to them as a significant challenge.
The policy implications of this study are obvious. The findings emphasize
the value of considering business climate improvements in the light of the
incentives for firms to react against corruption. The study also demonstrates
the value of local judicial institutions. Where the quality of these institutions
is high, this has a direct impact on the incentives of firms to react against
an unfavourable business climate rather than take part.
However, there are indeed directions in which this research should be
continued. This present analysis assumes, for instance, that firms only con-
sider the profitability of alternative strategies when deciding how to respond
to corruption; the paper does not explore cases when firms are inherently
honest or very risk averse. Technicalities such as quantity limitations and
discount rates are important aspects of commercial decision-making, and are
not considered here. And, although the findings help to explain the correla-
tion between corruption and collusion, the study does not identify the further
implications of this correlation, for instance, on polarization of business cli-
mates. Moreover, the paper describes, but does not solve, the problem that
only firms with above average profitability can act responsibly, that is, more
responsibly than firms with low to average profitability. Overcoming this
obstacle to ethical business practice constitutes a major challenge in so far
as consumer surplus and welfare obviously depend on competitive market
structures.
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5 Appendix
The potential cartel optimizes over quantities at heterogenous and
increasing marginal costs The setting is as given in Section 2.1. The
firms produce a homogenous output, the demand for which is given by the
inverse linear demand function, p(Q) = 1 − Q, where Q = ΣNi=1qi. Assume
sunk fixed cost and the variable cost of ciq
2
i
2
.
max Πm = Q
∙
pm −
N
Σ
i=1
ciq
2
i
2
¸
(15)
Marginal cost, MC, is thus ciqi, while average MC is ΣNi ciqi/N. If average
production is q = Q/N while c represents the average ”technology” applied
by the cartel, the colluders’ average marginal cost is MC = cq = c(Q/N).
Each cartel member’s output depends on its relative marginal costs. For the
average participant,
MCi =MC ⇒ ciqi = c(Q/N)⇒ qi =
cQ
ciN
Applying the average variable cost, V C = cq2/2 = c (Q/N)
2
2
, in (15), implies:
Πm = pmQ−N(V C) = (1−Q)Q− cQ
2
2N
The first order condition of this expression leads to the optimal total
quantity, Qm = N
2N+c
, which provides us with a total cartel profit of Πm =
N
2(2N+c)
. The individual firm’s quantity is thus
qi =
cQ
ciN
=
c( N
2N+c
)
ciN
=
c
(2N + c)ci
and its profit:
πmi =
c
2(2N + c)ci
(16)
Cournot-competition under the same assumptions implyQC = N
1+N+c
and
qi =
1+c
(1+N+c)(2+ci)
), which leads to:
πCi =
1
2
(1 + c)2
(1 +N + c)2 (2 + ci)
2 (17)
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πmi > π
C
i is true for all values of ci, and the potential whistle-blower
will always prefer collusion, and never speak out about cases of business-
corruption if this could harm the wished for cooperation. The assumptions of
increasing marginal costs and optimization across qi implies that the benefit
of relative eﬃciency is larger in collusion compared to Cournot-competition.
A firm would never react against corruption under these assumptions. The
expected eﬃciency of the considered cartel is thus important in a firm’s
propensity to confront a competitor that is responsible for corporate crime.
If higher levels of corruption imply opportunities for more eﬃcient forms of
collusion, no firm would speak out about bribery given the negative influence
this could have on its cooperation with its “competitors”.
Political corruption: Ties between politicians and only one of the
firms Consider the case when politicians in key positions obtain personal
benefits from only one of the local firms, benefits which take the form of
either illegal bribes or legal ownership shares. Although the politicians max-
imize the same utility function, (10), the significance of the diﬀerence in the
situation follows directly from the analysis in Section 2. The politicians’ ben-
efits depend directly on the profit of “their” specific firm. The calculation of
this profit and the trade-oﬀ underpinning the politicians’ choice are identical
to the calculations involved in the potential whistle-blower’s decision about
revealing corruption or not. However, the perspective diﬀers if we now con-
sider the benefits of another firm with political ties. By help of (4) and (2)
we consider the revenues and marginal costs of the firm, j, and not the po-
tential whistle-blower, firm i. Firm i, will influence firm j’s profit by raising
or reducing the average marginal cost, c.
Following this line of argument we hypothesize that a potential whistle-
blower would not be supported by corrupt politicians with personal benefits
in one of the firms in the market unless: (i) the potential whistle-blower is an
ineﬃcient producer, and (ii), the firm oﬀering bribes, or other benefits to the
given politicians, is relatively eﬃcient. It follows from (2) that ∂πCj /∂c > 0 :
The firm with political ties would benefit under Cournot-competition if the
whistle-blower is relatively ineﬃcient since this would raise the average mar-
ginal cost in the industry. But, from (5) we know that a local producer will
keep to the cartel solution, unless this firm has a certain marginal cost ad-
vantage. Only an ineﬃcient firm could increase the briber’s relative marginal
cost advantage, as specified by (5), so that the Cournot alternative becomes
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the more profitable solution, ∂πCj > ∂π
m
j . According to (4) and (2), however,
the firm would always try to establish some form of collusion if operating
with lower than average marginal costs, and in this case there would be no
whistle-blower for the politicians to support.
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SUMMARY
A recent business survey in Norway reveals that firms rarely react to corruption, 
even when they have lost important contracts as a result. This disinclination to 
take action is explored in the light of market structures, business efficiency, 
judicial institutions and political corruption. The paper develops a theory 
about how these four variables deter firms from reacting against corruption, 
and, in particular,  how the potential for collusion reinforces the incentives to 
remain silent. Considered separately, each of the factors are unable to explain 
the low frequency of anti-corruption reactions between firms. Considered 
in combination, however, the various impediments suggest a more complete 
explanation: When conditions in market structure suggest that the best 
response would be to take action, political conditions may favour inaction. 
When a potential whistle-blower expects support from local politicians or legal 
institutions, the given offender may be impervious to sanctions; its role in the 
market will not be altered by the given case. The sum of precondition for action 
suggests that firms rarely react against corruption.
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